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Draft 
(A chapter of a bigger research) 
 
Immigrants from the Near and Middle East in Bulgaria 
 
And the time shall come when the West shall 
be pregnant with the East and the East shall 
be pregnant with the West…1 
 
At the end of 2001 the International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural 
Relations (IMIR) launched an interdisciplinary study under the working title ‘The New 
Minorities in Bulgaria.’ Such a study was much needed considering the dynamic 
migration processes in the last 14 years, in which Bulgaria attracted new immigrants from 
different countries while the already existing immigrant communities increased tangibly. 
The study concentrated on people with long-term and permanent residence permits.2 It 
did not cover foreigners with refugee status, although in the course of research the 
refugee issue inevitably cropped up as a potential source of new immigrants in Bulgaria. 
 
Preliminary data and working hypotheses. According to the National Statistical Institute 
(NSI), the number of people who identified themselves as Arabs in the 1992 census was 
5,438, and they presumably had legal status as Bulgarian citizens (naturalized citizens) or 
long-term residents. They are part of Bulgaria’s Muslim minority, which in 1992 
comprised 14% of the total population.3 
The 2001 census found that Bulgaria’s total population had declined by more than half a 
million, with the percentage share of Muslims decreasing from 14% in 1992 to 12.2% in 
2001. This decrease came solely from emigration among the local Muslims (Pomaks and 
Turks), since the inter-census period unquestionably saw intensive immigration from the 
Near and Middle East. 
Unfortunately, the data from the last census (2001) do not provide information about the 
immigration flows towards Bulgaria. It is not clear why even the more than 5,000 people 
who identified themselves as Arabs in the 1992 census do not figure in the 2001 data. 
The imprecise census-taking method becomes even more obvious from another survey of 
the NSI of 1 March 2001 where almost 19,000 persons from other countries took part in 
the internal migrations in Bulgaria (settling in different towns and villages). According to 
our working hypothesis, most of them came from the Near and Middle East and China.4 
                                                 
1 Hadith quoted by a Muslim Rom member of the research team. Interpretation: This saying, which is 
attributed to the Prophet, foretells an age in which the West will be attracted by the values of the East and 
Islamic civilization and will embrace them, whilst the people from the East will be strongly tempted by 
Western civilization and will wish to live in it. But this will happen only after many ordeals, hostilities and 
conflicts in the battle for superiority. 
2 According to National Police data, at the end of 2001 the number of foreign citizens with permanent 
residence permits in Bulgaria was 43,630. Another approximately 24,000 were authorized to stay for up to 
one year. According to the respondents, the majority of them had lived in the country for several years prior 
to being granted permanent residence permits. All this gives us grounds to assume that the real number of 
foreigners residing permanently in Bulgaria is considerably larger than the official data. 
3 Zhelyazkova, A. Bulgaria, in: A Guidebook on Muslims in the Wide Contemporary Europe, 
Academia Bruylant, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2002, p.29. 
4 NSI, 2001 Census. 
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Our team’s attempts to achieve greater accuracy proved a tough task because the official 
figures on foreigners who arrive, stay and depart from the country vary and are based on 
different criteria. In all likelihood, the data from the Interior Ministry are the most 
accurate. For example, according to police data the number of long-term residents was 
18,568 in 2000, rising to 24,000 in 2001. To this we must add 43,630 permanent 
residents. According to police data again, for example the number only of Syrians with 
long-term and permanent residence permits in Bulgaria approximated 3,000 in 2001, 
whereas that of Lebanese with permanent residence permits was 625. It remains unclear 
why the NSI does not collect and include such data in the national censuses. 
On the other hand, a Foreign Ministry source claims that the Lebanese have registered 
more than 1,000 companies in Sofia alone, which suggests that their total number in 
Bulgaria is considerably higher than the figures reported by the Interior Ministry. 
According to the same source, there are probably around 3,000 Syrians in Bulgaria, or 
roughly as many as indicated by police data. 
At the end of 2003 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) published a study 
that added another interpretation of the number of immigrants to the already available 
conflicting data. According to the IOM, the number of foreign citizens residing legally in 
Bulgaria with permanent and long-term residence permits approximated 60,000 in 2002, 
up from around 45,000 in 1994 (the IOM study traces the growth in immigration in the 
period year by year). The same study also examines the national structure of permanent 
and long-term foreign residents in Bulgaria in 2002, where the largest number was of 
immigrants from Russia, 19,113, Syria, 1,780, Iraq, 390, Iran, 275, Afghanistan, 129 etc.5 
To judge from the different estimates, which are approximate, the number of legal 
immigrants is around 108,000: 3,600 naturalized, 40,000 with permanent residence 
permits, and 64,400 with long-term residence permits. Official records on asylum-seekers 
and refugees in Bulgaria started to be kept in 1991. The number of persons who applied 
for refugee status between 1994 and June 2001 was 7,029 from 66 countries: 4,394 men 
(62.51%), 252 women (17.81%) and 1,383 children (19.68%). The illegal immigrants in 
Bulgaria vary between 30,000 and 50,000.6 
Due to the complete absence of research on the subject, our working hypotheses were 
very general and open: 
• Immigration pressure in Bulgaria is growing steadily and is likely to soar around 
and after 2007, when the country is expected to join the European Union; 
• The immigration flows are and will remain almost entirely from underdeveloped 
and Muslim countries: the Near and Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Palestine, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, as well as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan), the 
Maghreb (Northwestern or Arab Africa – Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, Egypt), 
Asia, the Balkans etc.; 
• At present there are no tensions between the indigenous population and 
immigrants, but the latter’s potential increase might give rise to xenophobia, 
Islamophobia, racism and, consequently, social and employment discrimination, 
exclusion, ghettoization; 
• The complicated situation around the terrorist attacks conducted by extremist 
Islamic movements in the world prompted us to assume that there might be 
                                                 
5 Migration Trends in Selected EU Applicant Countries, Volume I - Bulgaria, IOM, 2003, p.93. 
6 http://www.pace-project.infp/html/bulgarian_report.htm. 
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Islamic propagandists (with the status of legal or illegal immigrants) among the 
indigenous Muslim minorities in Bulgaria. 
 
Regulation. The key law regulating the status of immigrants is the Foreigners in the 
Republic of Bulgaria Act (FRBA) from 1998. This law superseded the 1972 Sojourn of 
Foreigners in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria Act, and has been repeatedly revised to 
ensure maximum harmonization with the acquis communautaire. To understand the full 
implications of the legal provisions discussed below, we must first note that according to 
the FRBA (Article 2), a ‘foreigner’ means any person who is not a Bulgarian citizen or 
any person who is not treated as a citizen of any State in accordance with the legislation 
thereof and holds an official document certifying this status. Second, it must be noted that 
there are three possible forms of stay of foreigners in Bulgaria: short-term stay, for up to 
90 days; and long-term residence, which is subdivided into durable, for an authorized 
term of up to one year, and permanent, for an indefinite authorized term. 
As regards employment of foreigners, the FRBA provides that those who have been 
granted a permanent residence permit are subject to employment under the terms and 
procedures established for Bulgarian citizens. Foreigners who have been permitted short-
term or durable stay may also be employed, following the receipt of permission from the 
competent bodies of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (MLSP), but only by the 
employer and for the period of time specified in their work permit (Article 33). It is also 
noteworthy that the very wish to work under a contract of employment with the 
permission of the MLSP is a ground for granting a durable residence permit (Article 24). 
Foreigners working in the Republic of Bulgaria under a duly granted work permit have 
the rights and obligations of Bulgarian citizens unless the international treaties to which 
Bulgaria is a signatory provide otherwise (Article 5). 
The latest Employment Act (January 2002) and an Ordinance (April 2002) have revoked 
the provision requiring the families of duly employed foreigners to have work permits for 
access to the labour market. Bulgaria is making progress towards ensuring freedom of 
movement for persons. The European integration process, launched after 1998 and 
scheduled for completion in 2007, has prompted the Bulgarian authorities to pursue a 
policy of tolerance and non-discrimination towards foreign citizens, granting them all 
individual rights and freedoms irrespective of race, ethnicity, religion and/or skin colour. 
Another relevant law is the Asylum and Refugees Act (ARA), enforced at the end of 
2002. This law superseded the Refugees Act from 1999, and is also designed to 
harmonize Bulgarian legislation with world and European standards. The ARA regulates 
in a more consistent and coherent way the questions of refugees and granting of asylum, 
humanitarian and temporary protection. According to the ARA, persons who have been 
granted asylum or refugee status have equal rights on the labour market as all Bulgarian 
citizens. Similarly to other European countries, the restrictions concern some political 
and civil rights, such as the right to participate in general and municipal elections and in 
national and regional referenda, as well as to participate in the establishment of political 
parties and be a member of such parties; the right to hold positions for which Bulgarian 
citizenship is required by law; the right to be a member of the armed forces; and other 
restrictions explicitly laid down by law (Article 32). 
Any foreigner who has been granted humanitarian status has the same rights and 
obligations as a foreigner holding a permanent residence permit in the Republic of 
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Bulgaria (Article 36). In other words, all persons falling in those categories have full 
rights to employment and to trade union protection.7 This is also confirmed by the 
provision of Article 70 of the Employment Promotion Act (EPA), according to which 
foreigners with permanent residence permits as well as those who have been granted 
asylum, refugee or humanitarian status do not require preliminary permission from the 
Employment Agency in order to work. As regards those who have been granted 
temporary protection, they likewise have the right to work, but only under the terms 
specified by the Council of Ministers act granting them temporary protection. It is also 
noteworthy that the State Agency for Refugees is obligated to provide foreigners seeking, 
or who have been granted protection, help and assistance to adapt to the Bulgarian 
conditions; to organize Bulgarian language courses and vocational training courses; to 
assist for the integration of foreigners who have been granted protection; to develop 
independently or participate in the preparation of draft legal instruments and draft 
international treaties relating to the protection of foreigners, and to develop programmes 
for integrating the foreigners seeking or who have been granted protection in Bulgarian 
society (Article 53 of the ARA). 
 
Research methodology and team strategy. The growing number of immigrants in 
Bulgaria and the processes of their adaptation are of scientific interest to ethnologists, 
sociologists, historians, economists. It is extremely important and exciting for field 
researchers to have the chance to observe directly the initial processes of formation and 
structuring of micro-communities that have their own specific features and internal 
regulatory mechanisms: how they react to the requirements imposed by the Bulgarian 
macro-community, how the macro-community in its turn reacts to their emergence, the 
levels of adaptation and integration, the extent to which the own cultural archetype is 
preserved or assimilated, the possible risks or latent tensions resulting from expanding 
multiculturalism. 
This necessitated a comparatively longer period of empirical data collection: 
In the first stage of the study, the urgent anthropology team8 needed several months to 
form and elaborate a strategy before entering the immigrant communities from the Near 
and Middle East in Sofia and Plovdiv to conduct research under the working title ‘the 
Arabs as a new minority.’ The team conducted more than 50 interviews with immigrants 
who have been living in the country for a longer term and who were selected by random 
sampling. The majority of interviews were conducted with a single, and rarely with two 
or more respondents simultaneously. At the same time, a team member also established 
in-depth and longer-term relationships with members of the Arab community in Sofia, 
interviewing approximately ten people and taking part in several group discussions and 
thematic meetings. Experts in Arabic Studies, Islam and the Near East were also 
interviewed. This stage lasted, with several interruptions, from the end of 2001 to the end 
of 2003. 
In the second stage, the ASA sociological agency joined the study by conducting a survey 
in 18 regional centres (100 interviews) and in Sofia City, where it interviewed 123 
                                                 
7 Notably, the superseded Refugees Act provided that during the procedure for granting refugee status the 
respective person had to perform work organized by the Agency for Refugees – a hypothesis that is absent 
in the corresponding provision of the ARA. 
8 Antonina Zhelyazkova, Valeri Grigorov, Donka Dimitrova, and Asen Mitkov, mediator/interviewer. 
 6
people, all of them from Near and Middle Eastern origins. The data from this survey are 
indicative and, moreover, only of the employed immigrants from the Arab countries. The 
interviews were conducted at the respondents’ work place with standard questionnaires in 
April 2004 by ASA agency interviewers and IMIR anthropologists. Some of the 
interviews were conducted in the mosques in Sofia and Plovdiv. 
Parallel with that, the research team collected stage by stage information from different 
specialized state and public organizations and agencies, such as the Interior Ministry, the 
Foreign Ministry, the Bulgarian Red Cross, and the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees Branch Office in Bulgaria. 
 
The structure of the respondents interviewed by the urgent anthropologists may be 
represented as follows:9 
 
Country of origin: 
Syria                   22 Jordan                    3 Egypt                      1 
Lebanon               7 Iraq                        2 Iran                         1 
‘Palestine’           3 Afghanistan           2 Pakistan                  1 
 
 
EDUCATION AGE SEX RELIGION 
Senior college  16 18-30         
12 
Male     39 Muslim                          40 
Junior college    7 31-40         
19 
Female    3 Orthodox Christian         2 
Secondary        11 41-50         
10 
  
Primary              8 over 50  
1 
  
 
 
Intermarriage (with a Bulgarian woman) - 27 
 
Permanently resident in Bulgaria 
For less than 2 years    5 
2-3 years     5 
4-5 years                               12 
6-10 years                        14 
For more than 10 years   6 
 
One of the important elements of all field studies is assessing the degree of credibility of 
the information obtained from interviews. By rule, this degree cannot be invariable. In the 
process of communication the information may be consciously or unconsciously 
manipulated and interpreted in different ways both by the respondent and the interviewer. 
                                                 
9 The actual number of focus interviews was larger, but not all were comprehensive enough to be of use in 
the statistical analysis. 
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The reasons for that may vary. It is known that in different circumstances – provocative 
questions, a sense of personal threat, presence of outsiders, lack of time, a language 
barrier or others – respondents are inclined to give inaccurate and even deliberately false 
information. In a number of cases, owing to lack of interest in the subject in question or 
lack of a personal opinion, interviewees may simply reproduce popular stereotypes 
without necessarily believing in them. In other cases respondents claim to speak for the 
entire community, advancing personal opinions and ideas that are not necessarily valid 
for the community at large. In surveying immigrant communities the language problem is 
of primary importance. The accurate assessment of these and all other factors is critical 
for an objective analysis. In this context, the following must be noted: 
• All interviews with immigrants from the Near and Middle East were conducted in 
Bulgarian. The respondents’ command of the Bulgarian language varied, but the 
majority were fluent and could express themselves articulately enough. 
• The majority of interviews were conducted in the usual work place of the 
respondents: shops, restaurants, snack bars, market stalls, car repair shops, 
mosques. One of the problems in this type of interviewing is the respondents’ 
impossibility to ensure a private place where the interview will not be interrupted 
by casual visitors. Due to the nature of their work, some of the respondents were 
eager to get the interview over as quickly as possible and to return to their chores. 
This often necessitated reducing the number of discussed topics. 
• The interviews were usually recorded by hand with the respondent’s consent. In 
some cases (at the interviewer’s discretion) the interviews were not recorded but 
main parts of them were later written down or used in preparing the final analysis. 
The interviews were not video- or audiotaped since that might have been 
intimidating for the respondents. 
On the whole, the fieldwork proceeded in the usual way. The initial fears of complicated 
problems in view of the specificity of the object of research and public sentiments 
following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US proved unfounded in the first stage 
of the study. The respondents were comparatively willing to cooperate, and this 
facilitated the team’s work. 
By contrast, conducting the interviews and filling in the questionnaires proved much 
harder in the period after the war in Iraq and the deployment of the anti-terrorist coalition 
troops. The mounting international tensions associated with Al Quaeda’s terrorist attacks 
closed up and in a sense capsulated the Arab immigrants in Bulgaria, especially those 
who had arrived recently and were still inadequately adapted to the local conditions, as 
well as some individuals who were devout believers/active practitioners and propagators 
of untraditional for Bulgaria strands of Islam. This made it necessary to recruit a Muslim 
who acted as an intermediary and mediator of the team. 
 
Historical overview. Until the mid-1960s the number of foreigners from the Near and 
Middle East in Bulgaria was insignificant. In the early 60s the communist countries, 
Bulgaria included, launched a policy of recruiting students from the ‘developing’ world 
to universities, institutes and military schools as part of the ‘ideological struggle.’ As a 
result, from the mid-60s through the 80s tens of thousands of young people were 
admitted to Bulgarian institutions of higher learning. In this process special priority was 
given to the strategically important countries from the Near and Middle East. To regulate 
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the influx of foreign students, Bulgaria concluded agreements at different levels with a 
number of countries from the region. The large number of foreign students made it 
necessary to create a specialized Institute for Foreign Students (IFS) in 1965. 
The profile and structure of this first wave of foreigners in Bulgaria were quite 
homogeneous. The overwhelming majority were people in their 20s who stayed for the 
period of their studies (that is, from three to seven years) and then left Bulgaria. Some, 
however, married Bulgarian girls and remained in the country. In the 70s and 80s, those 
mixed marriages produced a second generation of immigrants that had not only mixed 
anthropological and racial features but also a specific national and religious identity. 
After 1989 the socioeconomic changes that took place as Bulgaria moved towards 
political democracy and market economy created conditions for a new, second wave of 
immigration from the Near and Middle East. The structure and profile of those new 
immigrants were considerably more heterogeneous. Besides the by then traditional group 
of foreign students, which decreased significantly in the 90s, a large number of small 
entrepreneurs and merchants arrived in the country. The data show that those new 
immigrants were not people who were ‘desperate and destitute’ in their home countries. 
The majority of them were middle-class: almost 10% were high-skilled professionals, 
more than 28% were university or school students, and more than 25% were private 
businessmen or craftsmen. Just 10% or thereabouts were unemployed back home and 
only some 6% were low-skilled. 
The group of entrepreneurs and merchants consists of two distinct subgroups. Most had 
never been to Bulgaria before, knew hardly anything about the country and did not speak 
Bulgarian. They said that their first problem was the language barrier. Interestingly, 
almost all learned Bulgarian after their second year. They were mainly self-taught, 
getting some help from co-nationals who were fluent in Bulgarian. The second main 
subgroup is comprised of former students who had completed their studies in Bulgaria in 
the 70s and 80s. Their return to the country had nothing to do with their earlier studies. 
Most of them are now working as merchants and middlemen. Their good knowledge of 
Bulgaria and Bulgarian is a precondition for their easy adaptation. 
Our observations that the Arabs learn Bulgarian fast and adapt easily to the new cultural 
milieu were interpreted by a respondent who is an expert in Arabic Studies as follows: 
‘Because of the specificity of their native language, it is easier for the Arabs to adapt 
swiftly to a foreign linguistic environment. Besides, as Muslims they view Christians 
through the prism of the Koranic tenet that the two religions are equal, that they have 
settled amidst “People of the Book” (Ahl al-Kitab). This helps immigrants accept the 
locals, i.e. the Bulgarians, as fellows. The idea of Islam is that it corrects, that it is 
nothing but a last corrective of Judaism and Christianity, with which it is essentially 
identical.’ 
As regards foreign language learning, another distinctive feature of the Arabs is also 
noteworthy. Their educational tradition is closely associated with memorizing. Because 
the most important thing for a Muslim who is capable of learning the Holy Koran by 
heart is to become a hafiz and to quote excerpts from the sacred text from memory 
throughout his life. That is why one might say that the Arabs are arguably more 
inclined to memorize. In this sense, Arab students in Bulgaria might initially have some 
problems in adapting to the Bulgarian educational system, which is based on a different 
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concept. Their culture is a culture of memorizing, a cultural of literal reproduction of the 
text, and they might find it difficult to adapt to the need of interpreting.  
To quote our respondent expert in Arabic Studies again, here is how he describes the 
Arabic language: ‘To put it in structuralistic terms, I think that Arabic has a plane of 
expression, with a difficult to grasp plane of content. For example, Arabic has thousands 
of words referring to camels but it does not have a term for “camel” in general. That is 
why Arabic is the language of poetry rather than of philosophy. As the sages say, if you 
put an Arab and a Greek in a beautiful garden, the Arab will write a poem in which each 
stamen of the flower will have its own name, while the Greek will start reflecting on the 
reasons for being, on metaphysics… On the verbal plane, Arabic is extremely rich – for 
example, Lisan al-arab (The Arabic Language), a 14th century lexicon, contains around 
four million words – but we Europeans need more content and that is why it is so difficult 
to translate. The miracle in Islam is linguistic, whereas the miracle for us Europeans is 
material. The Holy Koran is a Miracle because it is the Divine Word, it is the most 
eloquent possible that cannot be imitated either by man or by jinn – this is the Muslim 
concept of the Miracle, and hence the cult of words in Islam and the idea of words as 
deeds.’ 
Discussing the levels of dialogue between different peoples, religions and social strata, 
one of our respondents, a doctor from Morocco, underlined precisely the cult of words 
typical of Arabic culture: ‘People must talk to each other until they fall in a trance!’ 
Another respondent, who is from Iraq, defended himself against our reproaches that he 
was an inveterate atheist as follows: ‘I’ve read all about the world religions, I’ve read the 
complete Hegel, Spinoza, Schopenhauer… I’ve tried to find God but failed. Where is He? 
I believe in two things that are written in the Holy Koran: “to speak beautifully and to do 
good”.’ 
There was a similar cult of words in the culture of the Druids as part of Celtic culture. At 
their most extreme, the Druids refused to recognize the written word because they 
believed that this petrified the word, set it in stone, and did not allow it to develop. We 
have something similar in Islam – the revolt against Caliph Osman because he recorded 
the Holy Koran. He ventured to do something that no one before him had ever dared do 
because it was regarded as desecration of the Divine Word. The Sunna, the Hadith of 
Muhammad, started to be recorded a century and a half after the emergence of Islam and, 
moreover, after a century-long total and absolute ban on recording. Everything was 
memorized and transmitted orally. The oral tradition has its contemporary dimensions 
too, and that is why Arabic culture may be defined as mnemonic. 
Perhaps this factor is important as a kind of predisposition towards the new cultural 
milieu. However, it must be noted that this certainly does not apply to the entire Arab 
world or to the Muslims from the different Islamic dogmatic schools. According to the 
team of anthropologists conducting the present study, high adaptability is typical mainly 
of the Syrians, Iraqis and Lebanese, but this might also be due to the fact that they are the 
largest and oldest Arab immigrant communities in Bulgaria. 
The last few years have seen a considerable increase in the number of refugees, who have 
formed a new, significant group of foreign citizens in Bulgaria. Refugees, however, will 
be the object of a separate study. Insofar as our sample included some refugees from the 
Near and Middle East, we found that they do not have any financial resources of their 
own. By rule, they are employed as hired workers – vendors, shop assistants or porters in 
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the shops and at market stalls of co-nationals, and find it considerably harder to adapt to 
the new reality. 
 
Snapshot of the community. Taking into account the only reliable data on the number of 
Arabs in Bulgaria, i.e. those immigrants who identified themselves as such in the 1992 
census, and considering the dynamics of Arab immigration in Bulgaria as well as the 
percentages by periods obtained from the parallel collection of empirical data by the two 
teams of anthropologists and sociologists, our team estimates that the number of 
legally resident and officially employed Arab immigrants in Bulgaria in 2004 
approximates 17,000. Our hypothesis is that there are approximately as many Arabs 
with unregulated status in Bulgaria. 
The majority of immigrants from the Near and Middle East living permanently in 
Bulgaria are aged between 25 and 45, and they are mostly male. The average age of the 
Arab immigrants is 37.8 years. 
Based on the evidence of the respondents, we have tentatively divided the arrival of 
immigrants from the Near and Middle East and the Maghreb into three periods: before 
1990, from 1991 to 1997, and after 1997. Using the evidence provided by 223 
respondents, we drew medians indicating the peak years in each of our three tentative 
periods: 1986, 1993 and 2000 respectively. This allowed us to trace the dynamics of the 
migration process: approximately 32% of the Arab immigrants came before 1990, almost 
42% arrived in the second, and around 26% came to Bulgaria in the third period. 
Predictably, the average age of immigrants declines depending on the time of their 
arrival: from around 42 years for immigrants from the first, to 38 for those from the 
second, and 33 for those from the third period. 
This also applies to the connection between time of immigration and family status: 81.7% 
of the pre-1990 immigrants are married, as against approximately 72% of those who 
immigrated between 1991 and 1997, and slightly over 44% of immigrants after 1997. 
It is especially difficult to identify the profile of the immigrant community by gender, 
because by rule Arab women do not go to work whereas none of our respondents allowed 
us to interview his wife and children at home. Judging from 223 interviews from the 
indicative sociological survey as well as from 40 in-depth interviews conducted by the 
anthropologists, we are inclined to assume – and this is a very rough estimate – that just 
4% to 10% of the Arab immigrants are women. 
The largest group is that of the Syrians, who are approximately 52% of the ‘Arab’ 
community according to the anthropologists and more than 45% according to the 
sociological sample. There are also a considerable number of immigrants from Lebanon, 
14%; Iraq, 10.3%; Palestine, 8.1%; and Jordan, 3.6%. Among the comparatively smaller 
immigrant communities are those from Pakistan, 0.4%; Afghanistan, 1.8%; Egypt, 1.8%; 
Iran, 4%; Yemen, 3.1%; Saudi Arabia, 1.3%. The percentage share of immigrants from 
the Maghreb is in the same range: Algeria, 1.3%, Morocco, 2.2%, and Tunisia, 2.7%; as 
well as Libya, 0.4% of the sample. 
Territorially, the majority of immigrants live in Sofia. According to the respondents 
themselves, few of their co-nationals have settled out of Sofia; those who have are mainly 
in Plovdiv,10 Varna, Bourgas, Pazardjik, Pleven, Pernik, Veliko Turnovo, Yambol, 
                                                 
10 The study conducted in Plovdiv in March 2003 found that the number of Arab immigrants living 
permanently in the city is approximately 800 according to the respondents and 600 according to the 
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Blagoevgrad and several other cities. As the data from the sociological survey also show, 
there are immigrants from the Near and Middle East in around 23 of Bulgaria’s larger 
cities. On the whole, the immigrants are headed for Sofia and the large urban centres, 
which have a well-developed commercial infrastructure. There is no noticeable tendency 
for Arab immigrants to try and settle in towns with large local Muslim communities. In 
fact, the very opposite tendency may be observed: the Arabs avoid settling in towns 
where the censuses show there are compact groups of the Turkish minority. To our 
surprise, the sociological random sample in Kurdjali included only a single immigrant 
from Jordan, whereas the number of Chinese immigrants was considerably larger. The 
same applies to Razgrad: three Lebanese and one Syrian from the sample had chosen to 
settle in a town with a large indigenous Muslim community, whereas in Haskovo there 
were two immigrants from Syria and Yemen (according to our sample). Immigrants who 
have settled in villages with a Muslim majority are an exception – for example, in the 
village of Surnitsa there are two teachers at the local Islamic school who are from Saudi 
Arabia and they are Wahhabis. There are also individual cases of immigrants who have 
settled in such villages because they have married a local Muslim woman. 
As regards the choice of residential area in the respective city, 58.2% of the Arab 
immigrants live in all-Bulgarian neighbourhoods, 2.8% live in Turkish neighbourhoods, 
approximately 2% live among Roma, and around 37% are in mixed neighbourhoods (i.e. 
populated by Bulgarians, Armenians, Jews, Roma, Turks and other immigrants). At the 
same time, 67.6% of the Arabs claim that there are also other immigrants from different 
countries in their neighbourhood. The Arab immigrants assess the income level of 
residents in their neighbourhood as low, according to 25.7%, middle, 58.7%, and high, 
15.6%. 
Notably, 37% of the Arabs claim that there are other children of immigrants in the 
schools attended by their own children, which clearly shows a tendency towards an 
increase and steady dispersal of Arab immigrants among the Bulgarian majority. 
In analyzing the choice of place of residence, we established that some Arabs have settled 
in Roma neighbourhoods where the majority of Roma are Muslim and Roma who identify 
themselves as Turks. Those cases are not typical – they can be found in Hadjihassan 
Mahala, Stolipinovo and Sheker Mahala in Plovdiv, in Pazardjik and probably in other 
Roma neighbourhoods in the country – and the purpose is to preach a particular strand of 
Islam. The missionaries are from the following schools: Wahhabiyah,11 Habashiyah,12 
                                                                                                                                                 
specialized police services. Our observations in Plovdiv suggested that there is also an indefinite number of 
illegal immigrants from the Near and Middle East. Some Syrian and Lebanese respondents claimed that the 
real number of Arabs in Plovdiv was around 1,500, of which the naturalized Syrians alone were 200. This 
claim also supported our hypothesis that the Arabs with an unregulated or illegal status are almost as many 
as the legal immigrants. 
11 Wahhabiyah, another term for the Hanabilah. The Hanbalite school is one of the four Sunni schools of 
religious laws. It was founded by Ahmed ibn Hanbal from Baghdad. This is the most conservative and 
intolerant school of Islam today, found mainly in Saudi Arabia. It was dominant in Baghdad in the 12th and 
13th centuries, when the adherents to the other Shari’ah schools were subjected to fierce persecution. The 
followers of Ahmed ibn Hanbal are viewed by the other three schools above all as dogmatic theologians 
rather than as lawyers. (For details, see Чуков, В., Георгиев, В. Философия и теория на ислямското 
право, Sofia, ЛИК, 1997 and Мутафчиева, В., Желязкова, А. Турция между Изтока и Запада, 
Изд.Отворено общество, София, 1998 [Choukov, V., Georgiev, V. Philosophy and Theory of Islamic 
Law, Sofia, LIK, 1997; and Moutafchieva, V., Zhelyazkova, A. Turkey Between the East and the West, 
Open Society Press, Sofia, 1998].) 
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Nursiyah,13 as well as Sufism.14 Some of those missionaries – Arab immigrants from 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Somalia or Germany15 – recruit from 100 to 1,000 
followers, the majority of them Muslim Roma. Other immigrants have chosen to settle in 
a Roma neighbourhood because of the absence of prejudice – they are well received there 
and they can easily find low-paid workers or, in exchange for small incentives, followers 
and friends. 
In this connection, our respondents said that in addition to the street and Roma 
neighbourhoods, the mosques are the main centres for theological discussions, debates 
and recruitment of adherents and converts to different Islamic schools, as well as a 
regular place and time for meetings of Muslim immigrants – at Friday prayer. 
The largest Arab immigrant community in Bulgaria is the Syrian one – an average 48% 
to 50% of the respondents. Considering that the respondents in the anthropological field 
study were selected by random sampling, we may assume that the real percentage share 
of the Syrians living in Bulgaria is close to that of the respondents. 
The reasons for this relatively large percentage of Syrians in Bulgaria are mainly two: the 
large number of students who completed their higher education in Bulgaria in the 1970s 
and 80s, and the geographical proximity of the two countries. These two factors also 
account for the significant presence of Palestinians, Lebanese and Iraqis. 
The communities from the Middle East – Iranians, Pakistanis, Afghans – are smaller. The 
reasons for that are again associated with the two factors mentioned above: the number of 
students who completed their education in Bulgaria and geographical distance. 
Geographical distance is especially indicative. Almost all respondents said that they came 
to Bulgaria mainly by bus. The trip lasts 30 to 50 hours from the Near East, and 40 to 120 
hours from the Middle East. Fewer than 5% of the respondents came by air. 
 
Matrimonial and family practices. The high percentage of mixed marriages (more than 
70% of the Syrian respondents) is indicative of the immigrants’ desire to integrate into 
Bulgarian society. There are no conclusive data on the exact number of mixed marriages, 
but it is unquestionably very high. This conclusion is also confirmed by the low 
percentage of female immigrants from the Near and Middle East (around 10%), 
combined with the desire of single immigrants to find a wife or girlfriend as quickly as 
possible. Incidentally, cases in which in the course of their migration immigrants start a 
family in each of the countries where they stay for a longer time are not rare. We heard 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Habashiyah: a Muslim faction that emerged in the 1980s and is named Al-Habashi or Al-Ahbash after 
Abdullah al-Habashi, an Arab born in Ethiopia who developed his doctrine in Syria and Lebanon. It 
incorporates ideas from Sufism, Shi’ism, Ismalism and some aspects of Mutazilism. 
13 Nursiyah or Nurism: an Islamic movement that emerged in Turkey in the 1950s. Founded by 
Bediuzzaman Nursi as a mass movement towards a return to the norms of Islam. 
14 Sufism: a mystic, semi-monastic strand of Islam. The Sufi orders appeared around the mid-18th century. 
The actual theory of Islamic mysticism (Sufism) emerged at the end of the 12th century from Islamic 
sources, but under the influence of Christian hermitage and Hindu asceticism. In it one can detect elements 
of the ideas of Neoplatonism, Mazdaism or Buddhism. The development of Sufism in the Islamic world 
reached a point where it surpassed Christian mysticism by scope, influence and proliferation, and became a 
separate branch of Muslim philosophical-aesthetic, exegetic and artistic thought. For the Sufis the Shari’ah 
is an external form guiding the true believers towards a pious life and preparing them for the mystic path 
(tariqa). 
15 These missionaries do not follow the usual migration flows but arrive from the country from where they 
have been sent or where they preached before coming to Bulgaria. 
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such a story from a respondent from Iran: his father had come to Sofia as a political 
immigrant about ten years ago. He moved to Bulgaria from Germany. The father had a 
wife and one child in every country. Our respondent is the child from his father’s 
marriage in Iran, and he has a sister in Germany and a younger brother in Sofia. His 
dilemma at the time of the interview was whether to go to Germany, where his 
stepmother was very ill and had invited him to go in order to take over the family 
business and look after his sister. 
According to the respondents themselves, ‘more than 95% of the Syrians in Bulgaria are 
married to Bulgarian women.’ Even if it is inaccurate, this opinion is indicative of the 
desire of the majority of Syrian immigrants to marry a Bulgarian. They regard such a 
marriage as prestigious and desirable. 
The rate of intermarriage is also high among the other immigrant communities from the 
Near and Middle East. However, the relatively small number of those included in the 
statistical sample does not allow calculating an exact percentage. This high rate of 
intermarriage typical of immigrants from the Near and Middle East may be explained, 
among other things, by the established cultural model in the Arab countries that a man 
should not remain single for long, and by the definite racial and anthropological 
preferences of the Arabs for women with paler skin and fair hair. To this one should add 
the incredible speed with which all immigrants learn Bulgarian. The processes of 
secularization and the lower degree of religiosity of the Arabs from Syria, Iraq and 
Lebanon determine the absence of any religious prejudice in intermarriage with a 
Christian woman. It is interesting that with the exception of three cases, in which the 
ethnic and religious status of the wife did not become clear (probably the wives were 
Roma), all other respondents said that their wife is Christian Bulgarian. The Arabs are not 
prejudiced against cohabitation and marriage with Roma women. In some cases they 
even take advantage of the Roma matrimonial tradition which allows early marriage for 
girls, and conclude a traditional marriage (a ritual marriage that is not registered in the 
respective official institutions) with girls aged 14 to 16. The custom of paying baba hakki 
for the girl is also close to the Muslim tradition – a form of purchasing the girl from the 
father. It must be noted that such cases are rare, and the majority of mixed marriages are 
with Bulgarian women. 
To the reasons for intermarriage we might also add some immigrants’ problems in 
marrying in their native country, usually for social (class, caste, clan, family) and 
financial (inability to afford the price of and gifts for the bride-to-be) considerations, 
which in some cases is also one of the motives for migration. In Arab societies, the 
requirements for marriage are so strict that a man simply cannot afford to marry before 
acquiring sufficient wealth and social status. 
A female Bulgarian respondent who is an expert on the Near East claims that 
‘undoubtedly part of the immigrants come to acquire matrimonial experience in Bulgaria, 
because in their societies premarital contacts are not encouraged and in some countries 
they are even strictly punished. The reason why they come here and then stay on is, in 
some cases, the freedom of contacts with the opposite sex, sexual liberation as compared 
to their criteria and traditional experience.’ Because in their societies a wife must be 
purchased and marriage is a deal with strictly defined intermediaries, rules and contracts, 
immigrants strive to avoid the requirements for marriage in Arab society. This is very 
often one of the first ethnic insults they get from their Bulgarian wife in family rows: 
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‘When you’re incapable of anything you Arabs marry us Bulgarians because we are 
ready to marry you for nothing – for love only!’ 
Considering the entirely obvious fact that mixed marriages in Bulgaria are only between 
Arab men and Bulgarian women, and not the other way round, the following must be 
noted. A Muslim Arab can marry a woman from another religion who is not necessarily 
required to convert to Islam. Muslims follow the old Roman principle that the child 
belongs to the father. The incontestable rule is that the children belong to the father and 
the mother has no rights to them in the event of separation or divorce. Islam itself is an 
anti-matriarchal revolution in the sense that the status of women before Islam was 
different, especially in Mecca. In Mecca women were highly respected, and in many 
cases they had a dominant role and crucial say in society. Medina was strongly 
influenced by the Judeo-Christian tradition – hence the extremely low and rightless status 
of women and femininity in principle. The Prophet Muhammad made a big compromise 
between Mecca and Medina over the social role of women. 
Our respondent expert in Arabic Studies told us the following about the status of Arab 
women when we complained that we had failed to interview more than three or four 
immigrant women: ‘The woman is indeed largely a prisoner in her home. But the Arabs 
approve strongly of education. The majority of students in the universities in Iraq were 
girls. As regards the dowry, the family of an educated woman gets a much higher price 
for her. Admittedly, she rarely applies her education after marrying, but it has 
nevertheless raised her price. You mustn’t wonder that you didn’t come across working 
women among the immigrants, because it is a matter of honour for the man to look after 
his family and to provide everything. To allow your wife to work means that you are 
quite a failure as a man. They have a very strong sense of solidarity, so if your wife starts 
working this is a clear sign that you have been disowned by the clan itself, because clan 
solidarity and kinship must immediately be demonstrated if one of the members of the 
clan is in trouble.’ 
Tribal structure exists in the Arab countries, but it is quite dispersed as a form of 
organization. Tribal organization was inherited from the pre-Islamic age, but it was non-
homogenous even then – probably because of nomadism. It is claimed that Islam revoked 
it, replacing the tribal structure by the religious community, but in practice this is not the 
case. In fact, the present structure of society is not so much tribal as clan-based. Under 
Saddam Hussein priority was given to kinship in order to divide society, to trigger rivalry 
and conflict between the different clans. 
As regards the attitude to sons, it is unambiguous. The firstborn child must be a boy, and 
Arabs are even named after their firstborn child: for example, Abu Hassan or Abu 
Ahmed, which means Father of Hassan or Father of Ahmed. Being, say, Abu Fatima – in 
other words, the father of a firstborn daughter – is considered offensive and humiliating. 
Our respondent expert in Arabic Studies quoted the Holy Koran, which says that ‘when a 
daughter is announced to one of them his face becomes black and he is full of wrath’ 
[16:58]. 
Hence it is clear that if a Christian man marries a Muslim woman, very rare as such cases 
might be, he must convert to Islam because of the principle that the child belongs to the 
father. According to Islamic law, the child de jure and de facto adopts the father’s 
religion at birth. That is why in the frequent intermarriage between a Muslim man and a 
non-Muslim woman the latter may keep her religion because that is irrelevant to the next 
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generations. But a non-Muslim man who marries a Muslim woman must convert to Islam 
so that his offspring will be Muslim too. 
Considering the general concept of women in Muslim Arab societies, the status of the 
mother is quite interesting. The mother is regarded as sacred. Our team was told that an 
immigrant from Egypt had been killed several years ago because he had sworn at 
somebody referring to their mother. This Arab pre-Islamic cult of the mother is very 
popular in poetry and has survived to this very day, developed and promoted by Islamic 
tradition. 
As regards primogeniture, the legal practice in Islam is fairer compared to that in the 
West European tradition. The eldest son is not privileged. The issue is regulated by the 
Holy Koran, where the inheritance is not divided by primogeniture but by sex. Daughters 
get less than sons. For their part, the sons inherit equally – unlike Europe, where all the 
land went to the eldest son. This, of course, resulted from the principle that in the West 
the land was the property of the individual, whereas in the East it belonged to the state 
treasury. Even in early Islam as well as in the early Ottoman period, the land was the 
property of the community. For example, part of the land in Iraq is very fertile, but when 
it was conquered during the reign of Caliph Omar he issued special orders against 
granting land because it belonged to the state treasury. Of course, there was a system of 
granting land as a reward for service or in lieu of a regular wage for army officials – the 
so-called iqta – but it was granted for a limited period only and was not hereditary. The 
legend goes that Caliph Omar bequeathed the Arabs land laws, which were designed to 
preserve their mobility and militant spirit. These laws do not allow the Arab to become 
attached to a piece of land, he must be free and feel at home only in the army camp.16 In 
Islam this picture is very complicated, and Western historians have rather primitive 
notions of Islamic feudalism. The attitude to land and its allotment has nothing in 
common with Frankish feudalism in Western Europe. 
The relationships in mixed marriages are peculiar. One of the issues that might lead to 
conflict in the family is the place of residence in the long term. In the course of the field 
study we interviewed a Syrian aged around 60, an ex-military officer, who had received a 
lump sum in dollars upon retirement with which he had started a private business in a 
better economic environment in Bulgaria in the early 90s. He married a Bulgarian who 
was almost 30 years his junior. They have two small children. His shop in the big market-
place in Plovdiv was glutted with household appliances but there were few if any clients. 
He told us how rich he had felt with his approximately ten thousand dollars in the early 
90s, when the steadily rising dollar against the lev had allowed him to expand his 
business. In 2002 his business declined – the state tightened controls and it was no longer 
possible to import goods illegally or dodge taxes, rent and utility bills soared, prices were 
rising and clients were decreasing. In this business climate he was thinking about 
returning to Syria, where he would at least have the moral support of his family and 
kinsfolk. After declaring that he was determined to return to his native country, he was 
distracted by a potential client and we had an opportunity to speak with his Bulgarian 
wife. Asked if she was ready to move to Syria, she looked at us and told us firmly: ‘I’ll 
never move to Syria. He only thinks that we’ll move there. There’s no way we’ll do that. 
                                                 
16 Желязкова, А. Разпространение на исляма в западнобалканските земи под османска власт, София, 
1990, Издателство на БАН, с.30. [Zhelyazkova, A. Proliferation of Islam in the Western Balkan Lands 
Under Ottoman Rule, Sofia, 1990, BAS Press, p.30.] 
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I’ve been there, we’ve visited his family and I know what it’s like. I’ll never set foot 
again in this poor and primitive country.’ Question: ‘Is it you who make the decisions?’ 
Answer: ‘In their culture it’s compulsory for the men to think that they are in charge and 
that everything is under their control. Of course, the main decisions concerning family 
policy and children are made by the women. But the men don’t realize it.’ 
A female respondent aged 30 whose father is Lebanese told us how she remembers that 
ever since her early childhood the main arguments between her parents were about where 
the family should live – even if those arguments were theoretical only because there was 
no real opportunity for moving. This battle was permanent, with a variable outcome. 
Depending on who gained the upper hand in the family, which has another two daughters, 
and if the circumstances allowed it, they would live in Bulgaria for several years and then 
spend a long time in Lebanon. For unclear reasons, her sisters and she spent their 
childhood in Beirut during the war, and she has traumatic memories of bombing, shelling, 
destruction and fear. When her father, who is about 25 years older than her mother, grew 
old, he wanted to settle down permanently in Lebanon. This sparked the last, crucial 
battle in the family, which – predictably – was won by the wife, and the family finally 
settled down in Sofia. 
Of course, this choice is not always in favour of the women. According to the consular 
section at the Bulgarian embassy in Beirut, the number of Bulgarians who are living 
temporarily or permanently in Lebanon is 210. Besides those who are registered 
officially, it is estimated that there are another approximately 500. The majority are 
Bulgarian women who have married Lebanese men and have kept their Bulgarian 
citizenship. Part of their children are also Bulgarian citizens. On the whole, the Bulgarian 
colony consists of two generations: Bulgarian women who settled in Lebanon in the 
1950s and 60s, and those who came in the 70s and 80s. 
It was interesting for us to find out if the first spontaneous insults in the event of a family 
row were ethnic-based. In the Bulgarian interethnic traditional practice, intermarriage 
with the indigenous minorities – Turks or Roma – is not tolerated because it is assumed, 
especially in mixed communities, that a silly family row between young spouses might 
spark interethnic hostility and upset the interethnic peace and understanding. The 
majority of our Arab respondents admitted that ethnic insults are a fact – when you really 
want to hurt your partner in a family row, ethnic labels are the most painful. 
Interviewing a respondent who is an expert on the Near East, we decided to fill in the 
picture of family relationships by raising the issue of blood feuds. Question: ‘What could 
cause a blood feud among the Arabs?’ Answer: ‘Anything might cause a feud, from a bad 
word to murder. The Arabs have a cult of words. In the pre-Islamic and early Islamic 
ages poetry had a virtual physical impact. Enemies would meet on the battleground, the 
poets would step forward and recite their satires against each other, then everybody 
would go home without spilling a drop of blood even though there was in fact a winner 
and a loser. The word is believed to have a physical impact, and that is precisely why the 
Arabs don’t have our all too familiar curses and swear words involving sexuality in some 
way.’ 
One of the important principles in Islamic Arabic culture is that deeds are realized 
through intents. A deed that has not been declared in advance as an intent is invalid. 
Whereas a declaration of intent necessarily leads to action – this is a fundamental 
principle in Muslim law and jurisprudence. When a Muslim sets out on a pilgrimage he 
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declares that he is going on a pilgrimage to Mecca. If he does not declare it, the 
pilgrimage is invalid, it is not recognized by Allah. On the other hand, these words are so 
binding that a Muslim who has uttered them would rather die than return without making 
the pilgrimage (hajj). 
The principle that actions are fulfilled through intents, that in this sense words have a 
physical impact, are valid to this very day. Question: ‘Does this mean that the Arabs 
rarely make promises?’ Answer: ‘Promises are made, but the promise has material power 
and it simply must be fulfilled. In Arabic, verbs have a form which we call status 
energicus – a specific affixation of the verb by which the speaker implicitly declares that 
he or she will do something. Once you have declared it in this way you are obliged to 
perform the action in question even if that means you might die. Saying “I’ll go to 
Mecca” or Se el habbu is very different from using status energicus: La el habanna. The 
double n in the ending signifies the oath, it intensifies the action itself and turns it into an 
oath that must be kept at any cost. As regards blood feuds, they are also an absolute 
imperative. It has been believed since ancient times that on the grave of the killed person 
there is a bird, which they call hamma or sada, that stands there, crying: “Quench my 
thirst!” (with the blood of the killer). This bird is believed to fly out of the head of the 
victim in some way, after which it perches on the grave and stays there, crying until the 
death is revenged.’ These are ancient pagan customs, but although it categorically 
condemns paganism Islam is in many cases a thin layer over ancient rituals. That is why 
the status of blood feuds has remained the same. 
 
In-group organization. Judging from the responses of the majority of Arab immigrants, 
we concluded that the Arabs do not have a strong sense of solidarity, i.e. of belonging to 
one nation. Most respondents claimed that they have many differences that divide them 
and that is why they cannot act as a single organism or nation. 
In the course of the field study, we identified a clear hierarchy in the assessments and 
stereotypes of some Arabs about others, depending on their geographical origin: 1. A 
division between Arabs from the oil-producing countries and Arabs from the countries 
poor in natural resources: ‘them lazy oil-rich Arabs’ and ‘us hard-working poor Arabs.’ 
2. Stereotypes popular among the Arabs themselves and associated with ancient origins, 
hereditary regional and ethnographic characteristics, and education. The Lebanese are 
rated highest by intelligence, ancient history and culture. As one respondent from Syria – 
a doctor and prosperous businessman – told us, ‘the Lebanese are vastly superior to us.’ 
Another respondent noted that ‘them Egyptians are really vulgar.’ 
We asked our expert in Arabic Studies to explain this cultural hierarchy: ‘The Lebanese 
themselves, as well as the Palestinians, are reluctant to identify themselves as Arabs. 
They prefer going back to the Homeric age, to Achaean migrations that reached Lebanon, 
Palestine, Phoenicia, and perceiving themselves as Phoenicians. This attempt at self-
identification with older cultures is typical of the entire Arab world. As the Iraqis say, “ 
“We are Assyrians, we aren’t Arabs but Assyrians”. Perhaps this comes from the 
contempt of foreign cultures for the Arabs. For example, let’s consider how a Persian 
would see the Arab historically: the Arab is an illiterate bedouin who will eat dry, burned 
desert plants and camel droppings in lean years, or even camel hair ground with blood. At 
its zenith in the Middle Ages, Arabic culture as such was itself largely the product of 
non-Arabs. It flowered in two regions: Iraq, which was actually on the territory of Persia, 
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and Spain, a melting pot of many cultures where we have top achievements of Islamic 
civilization which, however, is syncretic.’ 
As regards the Egyptians, they are lowest in the hierarchy. They are the menial workers, 
the Gastarbeiters of the Arab world. Egypt is under huge demographic pressure and 
exports labour on a massive scale. The common stereotypes about the Egyptians in the 
Arab and Muslim world depict them as greedy, unscrupulous and treacherous – in short, 
the very opposite of the Islamic norms. The Egyptians love calling themselves pharaohs, 
and the police officers who meet them at Baghdad airport when they arrive in search for 
jobs treat them as animals – they shepherd them towards a separate terminal, striking 
them with huge batons as if they were a herd. 
According to another respondent who is an expert on the Near East, those who have the 
highest self-confidence in their own intelligence and culture among the Arabs are the 
Palestinians, even though there is a huge division between them: there are highly 
educated and there are extremely backward Palestinians. The Lebanese perceive 
themselves as descendants of the Phoenicians and as the brain of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. They look down especially on the Syrians, and have many jokes about the 
dumb and simple Syrian peasant and the clever Lebanese who outwitted him. The Syrians 
are the lowest paid foreign workers in Lebanon – they will take the hardest jobs for about 
US$ 300 a month and accept to live in miserable living conditions. 
In politics, however, the relationship is the very opposite because Syria is the ‘big 
brother’ that dictates Lebanese policies. This contradiction provokes even stronger 
antagonism between the two Arab nations at the everyday level: the Lebanese are clever, 
cunning, well-educated and rich, whilst the Syrians are uneducated and poor, and deserve 
only the worst possible jobs. In other words, there is unquestionable subordination and 
stereotyping among the Arabs themselves, regardless of whether it is objective or not. 
Arabs from the Maghreb also have high self-confidence as people belonging to an ancient 
and advanced culture. This is amplified by a broader cross-civilizational self-awareness 
that they are part of the Mediterranean cultures. Perhaps that is why our respondents from 
Morocco and Algeria were more critical towards Bulgaria and the other European 
countries to which they had to emigrate. One of our Moroccan respondents said that he 
had a brother in Italy and another brother who was working in France. His patron there 
demanded 7,000 euro to appoint him in the place of a chef, and eventually tried to fire 
him in order to take a new bribe from the next chef. This led to a series of frequent 
changes and new appointments in exchange for bribes. Another Moroccan respondent 
said that he had gone to Lille to study dentistry but couldn’t get used to the ways of the 
French: ‘They claim to have a world cultural mission but deep down they are uncultured. 
I can’t accept their arrogance and sense of superiority.’ 
To this we should add the natural hierarchization by religious denomination as, for 
example, in a multi-religious Lebanon where the Sunnis look down on the Shiites – Sunni 
families are better educated, whereas Shiite families are bigger but commoner, they live 
in the rural areas and are poorer. Christian Arabs, such as the Maronites and Greek 
Catholics, have extremely high self-esteem, but they have lately become economically 
weak and are the largest source of emigration to Western Europe, the US and Australia. 
There are also the Druzes, who are such a specific denomination or, rather, a spiritual 
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category, that they are virtually unimaginable for the surrounding Muslim communities. 
There are Druzes in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan.17 
Viewed theoretically, this apparent diversity among the Arabs is a product of our 
European failure to understand the concept of the umma. For the Muslims, the umma is a 
community and it is essentially supra-national, but it is misperceived by the Europeans as 
a nation. It is another matter that among the Arabs themselves it is claimed that there is or 
should be a unified Muslim umma, but reality has led to the emergence of specific 
national archetypes as a result of historical or tribal territorial division, or specific cultural 
traits based on different historical experience and natural environment. 
Territorially and politically, the umma is represented by the House of Islam (dar-ul Islam) 
and it is manifested at the local, national and regional level. At each of those levels 
Muslims must feel that they belong to it as an organization based on theocratic principles. 
The umma is guided by divine law and, in this sense, it is both a theocracy and a 
logocracy consecrated by Allah – a community that follows the Divine Word.18 That is 
why a universal agreement (ijma) reached by consensus by the Muslim community is 
regarded as infallible because the Prophet himself said that ‘My people will never agree 
in an error.’ This does not conflict with the historical fact that political divisions emerged 
within the House of Islam as early as the 11th and 12th centuries. That is when the Arabs 
gave up a considerable part of their superiority but their language, as the language of the 
Koran, continued to be regarded as God’s chosen and to play a central ritual, 
administrative and cultural role. Persian language and culture also won significant 
ground. It is precisely in the politically fractured House of Islam that one can see the 
ability of its inhabitants to deepen their spiritual and cultural unity.19 
 
Despite its relatively large size, the Syrian community in Bulgaria remains comparatively 
unconsolidated. The study shows that it does not strive towards compact settlement and 
cultural isolation. Almost all respondents stressed their desire for greater integration with 
the Bulgarians. 
For the majority of Syrian respondents, participation in community meetings is limited to 
the celebrations of the national day at the Syrian embassy. Every year on that day an 
embassy representative goes to Plovdiv to organize a meeting of the small Syrian 
community (around 250 people) in the city. Besides lifting the national spirit, these 
regular meetings provide the Syrian services with an opportunity for control and impact 
over the immigrants. The activities of the Association of Syrians in Bulgaria, Rupta 
Sutriye and Organization of Syrian Students in Bulgaria are also under the direct control 
of the Syrian embassy in Sofia. 
In practice there are no autonomous and independent immigrant public structures. That is 
why part of the Syrians, especially those who have more critical and oppositionist views, 
                                                 
17 The Druzes do not have written religious laws. They have rules that are passed on orally from one 
generation to another. In the 11th century they seceded from Orthodox Islam – they believe in reincarnation. 
A Druze must die so that his soul can be reincarnated in the body of another. The women are veiled, with 
white headscarves trimmed with lace. The traditional male costume consists of black trousers, a black 
waistcoat and white knitted cap. They are endogamous. A Druze who marries a foreign woman is 
considered to have excommunicated himself. 
18 История на религиите, София, 1999, Гутенберг, с. 269. [A History of Religions, Sofia, 1999, 
Gutenberg, p.269]. 
19 Ibid. p. 254. 
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avoid attending the formal meetings. A far more popular form of contacts and interaction 
between co-nationals are the informal family and friendly gatherings that are attended not 
only by the Syrians but also by their Bulgarian wives. In this sense, the community has 
certain multiethnic and multicultural characteristics. 
On the whole, the Syrians are very well integrated into the Bulgarian ethnocultural 
milieu. Statements such as the following are not infrequent: ‘I now have more contacts 
with Bulgarians [than with co-nationals]; my family is here and my children are here; I 
feel more Bulgarian than Syrian; Bulgaria is my second homeland.’ 
The Syrian community in Sofia as well as in Plovdiv and elsewhere lives in different 
neighbourhoods in various parts of town. There is no visible effort to settle in compact 
groups in a particular neighbourhood or street. The majority of respondents live in rented 
apartments. The few who have bought an apartment have been married to a Bulgarian for 
a longer time and do so under pressure from her family. They said they prefer renting 
because of the low rents in Bulgaria. According to a popular Arab saying, ‘a shop can 
feed the family,’ so all the money available is invested in business. The logic of the 
Bulgarians that owning a home is a must seems rather impractical and economically 
inexpedient to the Arabs. The non-attachment of Arab immigrants to a particular home 
may suggest a latent sense of transience – a person who has once left his native country 
remains a potential emigrant for life. 
By and large, the other bigger Arab communities – Lebanese, Iraqis, Palestinians – also 
have immigrant organizations, but the most common form of contacts are kinship 
networks, circles of friends or informal contacts between co-nationals. 
Arab immigrants with higher education and prestigious occupations are likely to create 
various cultural and political associations, but they are formal only, do not function and 
the activities around them are usually limited to their constitution and registration in 
court. A member of our team is the co-founder, together with other Bulgarian 
intellectuals, of the registered in 2002 Association of the Arab Intelligentsia and Friends, 
which includes Arabs from different countries from the Maghreb and Near East. The 
purpose of the association is ‘to promote the peaceful cohabitation of different cultures 
and communities by means of: organizing courses and seminars, assisting newly arrived 
foreigners from different countries for the purpose of their adaptation to and integration 
into Bulgarian society, and to facilitate Bulgarian society in interaction and contacts with 
incoming foreigners (investors, students, merchants, seconded officials), assisting and 
facilitating Bulgarian citizens who visit the Arab countries for various reasons, liaising 
with competent public authorities and nongovernmental organizations…’20 
This association, as most of the others, has practically done nothing to date, but it 
demonstrates the internal need of the Arabs to integrate fully into their new homeland, 
their wish to be better understood as a cultural community and as individuals. There is a 
distinct desire among the well-educated immigrants to be accepted as part of Bulgaria’s 
intellectual elite while serving as intermediaries between Arab Muslim culture and the 
local tradition. 
 
Arab immigrants about the Bulgarians. The attitude of the interviewed foreigners 
towards the Bulgarians (as a community) is by rule very positive. The standard 
                                                 
20 Sofia City Court Judgement No. 1 dated 28 June 2002 in the matter of Company Case No. 5104/2002. 
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qualifications are, for example: ‘good people, friendly, nice, alert, open-minded, modern, 
normal people like us, warm like us, I like everything in Bulgaria.’ 
The comparison between the two cultures is also favourable for the Bulgarians: ‘Our 
people are more conservative, while the Bulgarians are Europeans.’ According to a boy 
of 14 from a mixed marriage (Syrian father and Bulgarian mother), ‘People here are more 
open, while in Syria they are more narrow-minded’; ‘in Syria they tell me that I’m a 
European.’ 
The respondents also respect the Christian Orthodox tradition of the Bulgarians. Almost 
all have taken part, in one form or another, in the celebration of major Orthodox festivals. 
‘At home we celebrate the Christian festivals more – especially Easter, New Year, 
Christmas.’ The respect for the Christian tradition is a kind of demonstration of loyalty to 
the Bulgarian community, a desire for tolerance in relationships and for a high level of 
integration. 
More differentiated opinions about the Bulgarians may be found mainly among the 
students. According to some, ‘living in Student Town is dangerous – I’ve been burgled 
several times.’ In cases of intermarriage, it is quite common for the Bulgarian relatives to 
demonstrate initial disrespect for the Arab and Muslim origins of the husband. One of the 
respondents complained that he’d heard his mother-in-law ask his wife, ‘Why on earth 
did you choose that gypsy.’ Another respondent married to a Bulgarian is adamant that 
there is no such thing as a happy mixed marriage, adding that ‘the cultural differences are 
an obstacle.’ 
Some of the respondents said that they have felt disrespect in various forms on the part of 
the Bulgarians because of their racial and cultural differences. ‘I might be wrong, but it 
seems to me that the Bulgarians are in a way racist towards people with darker skin. This 
racism isn’t aggressive but you can feel how they are discussing you behind your back.’ 
Another respondent added that, nevertheless, ‘the Bulgarians hate the Gypsies more than 
the Arabs.’ Incidentally, quite a few respondents said that the cases in which they had 
been treated contemptuously were in fact a matter of mistaken identity because the 
Bulgarians had mistaken them for Roma. Once the confusion was sorted out, the 
Bulgarians would apologize: ‘Sorry, pal, we took you for a mangal21…’ This attitude 
shocks the Arabs because they do not try to avoid the Roma, they have Roma friends and 
often employ Roma workers. 
Assessing the Bulgarians as workers, some owners of restaurants and snack bars said that 
they are lazier than the Arabs and steal at every opportunity even though they receive a 
salary. At the same time, they admitted that no Arab from their countries would take such 
a low paid job. What is especially foreign to their mentality is the distanced attitude of 
the employed Bulgarians to the job they are paid to do. As a respondent employer noted, 
‘When one of us is given a job we’ll become loyal to the boss well-nigh to the grave. We 
devote ourselves completely to the job and do our best even if the company might belong 
to someone else. That’s simply the way we are, the way we’ve been brought up. While 
the Bulgarians come to work and you can see they’re bored to death, they won’t make the 
slightest effort and don’t care about the employer’s prosperity as if it wasn’t in their own 
interest too… They are ready to leave the customer right in the middle of the deal or 
service because it’s time for their break…’ 
                                                 
21 A very pejorative and offensive term for ‘Rom.’ 
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Perhaps that is also why the immigrants from the Near and Middle East who have a 
private business employ not only Bulgarians but also co-nationals in 35% of the cases; 
around 16% employ workers from the local ethnic minorities, i.e. Roma and Turks, and 
another 15% employ other local immigrants. 
Still, the findings suggest that despite some negative assessments the majority of 
respondents have a definitely positive attitude towards the Bulgarians. In the few cases 
where there are negative feelings, these are usually associated with a particular event or 
incident and are seldom transferred to the entire Bulgarian community. Most of the 
respondents said that they have not been an object of deliberate discrimination or 
xenophobia and think that the Bulgarians are very tolerant towards foreigners. 
The Arab immigrants want to have Bulgarian friends and have actually established 
lasting friendships. When Arabs work in Bulgarian teams they are usually loyal to the 
respective institution or employer, and even more so to their fellow workers. 
Asked whether their children have Bulgarian friends, almost 83% said they did: ‘Most of 
their friends are Bulgarian.’ The answers to the question, ‘Where would you like your 
children to settle in future?’ were similar: 56% of the respondents would like their 
children to settle in Bulgaria, against 28% who want them to return home and 16% who 
hope that their children will build their life in another country. 
These positive feelings were also obvious in the attitude to our team and the interviewers: 
63.6% of the respondents were well-disposed, 26.6% were indifferent, and just 9.9% 
responded reluctantly, refused to be interviewed or demonstrated their contempt. This 
may also be attributed to the level of adaptation, because immigrants from the first wave 
(before 1990) were the most responsive whereas the newcomers (around 2000) were the 
least responsive. 
When a member of our team visted a family with three children – where the father is 
Palestinian and the mother is Iraqi – a surprise visit on Easter to bring them painted eggs 
and traditional Bulgarian Easter cake, he was amazed to see a bowl full of Easter eggs in 
the very centre of the table. Seeing her guest’s confusion, the Iraqi woman smiled and 
explained: ‘We do what you do. It’s Easter and one must paint eggs. We did them 
together with the children. Please take two of ours and give them to your sons. With our 
best wishes for a happy Easter.’ 
The respondents also have folklore dedicated with sad self-irony to the choice of Bulgaria 
as a new homeland. Asked how he had ended up in Bulgaria, a respondent told us a joke 
he had heard from a friend of his from Zaire: ‘There was this plane flying over Africa and 
trailing a rope. So because we’re monkeys we grabbed the rope and the rope tore over 
Bulgaria…’ 
One of our respondents from Morocco is so deeply attached to Bulgaria that he dreams of 
the time when the two countries will open up as much as possible towards each other in 
every way. He told us how he had looked in encyclopaedias for ages, trying to find a bird 
that migrates to Morocco in winter and returns back to Bulgaria in summer. ‘Don’t look 
for it,’ a friend told him, ‘it’s you who are that bird!’ 
 
 
Arab immigrants about Bulgarian public institutions. The public institutions dealing 
directly with foreigners are the object of strongest criticism for misconduct. This applies 
especially to the Interior Ministry’s passport service. The unanimous opinion is that by 
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rule officials at the passport service take bribes from immigrants. ‘If you don’t give them 
a bribe you won’t get anywhere, they’ll turn you back several times, every time coming 
up with something that’s supposed to be wrong with your papers.’ 
Other criticized institutions are the tax and inspection services. In some cases officials 
from those services are said to have taken money unlawfully: ‘Because we don’t know 
the Bulgarian laws well they ask us to pay something and then it turns out that we 
shouldn’t have.’ 
Another problem noted by respondents are the constant revisions in the laws regulating 
fees and taxes. A student said that when he came to Bulgaria six years ago he had to pay 
a university tuition fee of 5,000 leva plus US$ 10 a year for every year of his stay in the 
country. He now has to pay 500 leva a year for his stay. ‘The terms and conditions 
change virtually every day and I no longer know what I’ll be charged next year.’ 
This is also one of the reasons for the absence of longer-term plans. Almost 36% of the 
respondents said that they haven’t decided yet whether they will settle down in Bulgaria 
permanently: ‘I don’t know how long I’ll be staying in Bulgaria – the laws change 
virtually every day. Right now we’re required to appoint at least ten Bulgarians or 
otherwise they’ll shut down our business.’ 
Another 5.4% intend to work in Bulgaria for some time and then move to another 
country, whereas 15% live and work in Bulgaria but plan to return home eventually. Still, 
the immigrants who have definitely chosen Bulgaria as their second homeland prevail – 
they are 43%. 
The majority of respondents think that the Bulgarian public institutions do not have a 
discriminatory attitude against foreigners: ‘There might be occasional cases, but this isn’t 
a government policy.’ Yet even so, the prevalent opinion is that Bulgarian institutions do 
not protect them effectively against the arbitrary actions of individual public officials. 
One of the demands in this respect is to introduce forms of control that will protect both 
Bulgarians and foreigners equally. ‘They shouldn’t treat us as if we were criminals just 
because we’re foreigners. There might be criminal elements amongst us, but the majority 
are decent and good people.’ 
Ultimately, our impression is that the Arab immigrants definitely like and respect their 
host country, that they want to be loyal citizens of Bulgaria and that society would stand 
to gain from a positive institutional policy towards the immigrants who have chosen our 
country. 
 
Bulgarians about the Arab immigrants. Establishing the attitude of the Bulgarians 
towards foreigners of Arab or Muslim origins living in the country was an important 
element of our study. For the purpose, we interviewed Bulgarians who happened to walk 
into the shops owned by immigrants or who worked and lived nearby. The accent in the 
questions was on the relationships between Bulgarians and foreigners living in the 
country, what the Bulgarians know about their culture, how they view their cultural 
differences, what they appreciate and what they don’t accept etc. 
The interviews showed that among the Bulgarians there are stable negative stereotypes 
about Arabic in particular and generally about Muslim culture and religion. The roots and 
reasons for those stereotypes are well known and can be traced historically. 
Bulgarian society commonly perceives Islamic culture as ‘primitive’ and ‘very different 
from Christian and Bulgarian culture.’ The attitude to the inferior status of Muslim 
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women is extremely negative. Wearing yashmaks and headscarves is defined as 
conflicting with the secular Bulgarian cultural model. Seeing Muslim women wearing 
headscarves, two teenagers exclaimed: ‘Just look at them, they’re Taleban.’ Referring to 
the terrorist attacks in the US, a Syrian woman said that the Bulgarians had very wrong 
ideas about the Muslims: ‘Some Bulgarians asked me if it was true (it was supposed to be 
written in the Holy Koran) that if a Muslim killed four Christians he’d go to heaven.’ 
An important indicator of the level of acceptance of the Other is the attitude to 
intermarriage. The majority of Bulgarian respondents would not marry a foreigner of 
Arab or Muslim origins. Such a marriage is seen as non-prestigious and justified only if 
the spouse is well-off. In cases of intermarriage, the Bulgarian relatives by rule do their 
best to make the couples change their mind. Some of the foreign respondents married to 
Bulgarians admitted that they were hurt by the negative and even offensive attitude of 
their wife’s family. According to others, they were at first frowned upon by the family 
but then things improved eventually: ‘When my wife’s family realized I was Muslim they 
turned against me, but then they eventually saw I was very religious and respected the 
Bulgarian traditions, and they calmed down and became friendlier.’ 
The high level of religious and cultural tolerance serves as an important factor for the 
conclusion and survival of mixed marriages. One of the questions to which the 
interviewed Arabs gave an almost identical answer was whether they celebrated Christian 
holidays. Not only those in mixed marriages but also part of the others underlined the fact 
that they celebrate both Muslim and Christian holidays and respect the Bulgarian 
traditions. 
The interviews with Bulgarians showed that little if any distinction is made between the 
different Arab nations. The Bulgarians usually equate Muslims with Arabs: ‘I don’t know 
where they are from – they are Arabs.’ 
When the Bulgarians discuss not the Arabs as a community but a particular individual – 
for example, their Arab neighbour, shop assistant or owner of their favourite Arab 
restaurant – their attitude is completely different. They evaluate above all the concrete 
personal qualities of the individual, tending to ignore the common group stereotypes. The 
majority of interviewed Bulgarians think that ‘the Arabs living in Bulgaria are good 
merchants, polite and considerate.’ Many of the Bulgarians who walked into the Arab 
shops and restaurants in the course of the interviews turned out to be regular customers. 
They are also the group of respondents that has the highest opinion of Arabs. 
The interviews showed the critical importance of distinguishing between group 
stereotypes and personal relationships. By rule, group stereotypes are formed on the basis 
of generalized clichés about historical events (real or mythologized) and superficial 
geopolitical knowledge. They are projected onto the contemporary dimensions of cultural 
and political confrontation, the idea of which is advanced by world philosophers and 
political gurus such as Samuel Huntington and his fashionable thesis about the clash of 
civilizations. Far healthier and more realistic as prospects for peace, multicultural 
coexistence and integration are the opinions and assessments of the Other which are 
based on personal cross-cultural relationships and contacts. In this case first-hand 
observations and personal experience play a leading role, and this invariably reduces the 
potential tensions that could lead from unfamiliarity or activation of defective group 
stereotypes to fear, exclusion/ghettoization and, ultimately, confrontation. 
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What is more important for our study is that irrespective of their positive or negative 
assessments of particular individuals or the group as a whole, all interviewed Bulgarians 
without exception realized and declared that they actually know little or nothing about the 
foreigners of Arab origin who live in Bulgaria. Thus their assessments and opinions are 
largely the fruit of particular public sentiments, moral views, outside influence and 
emotional attitudes. Another very important thing suggested by the interviews with 
Bulgarians is that these foreigners are not seen as a threat in any way – on the contrary, 
there is even goodwill towards them. This does not apply to the illegal immigrants who 
are regarded as criminal groups and have already caused some public concern and 
anxiety, without being nationally personified for the time being. 
 
Theoretical reflections. The changes in global politics and economy are most obvious in 
the change in the general direction of migration – from the South to the North and, in 
particular, from the Muslim world to the West. Today the Algerians in France, the Indo-
Pakistanis in the UK and the Turks in Germany are the second largest religious/ethnic 
group in the respective country. Dynamic globalization will accelerate migration 
movements. In a discussion on the subject of globalization, the mediator in our team told 
us an interesting thought, quoting the Prophet Muhammad (or the interpreting Hadith), 
and this became the motto of our study: ‘And the time shall come when the West shall be 
pregnant with the East and the East shall be pregnant with the West At present the East 
has become pregnant with the West, and the West is pregnant with the East…’ 
Today approximately one third of the world’s Muslims live as minorities in countries 
with a non-Muslim majority. This has changed the meaning of the term Muslim world, 
which no longer refers only to a particular geographical zone but has also become an 
important demographic factor in countries with a non-Muslim majority. A new 
interconnection has emerged between the Muslim countries in the traditional 
geographical zones of the Muslim world and their diasporas in other parts of the world. 
That is why it is impossible to make a categorical division between civilizations in the 
global era. Huntington’s division of ‘West and Others’ is neither true as a fact nor ethical 
as a norm.22 Today European cities have Muslim populations and ‘Chinatowns’ that 
cohabit with the local white Protestants, Catholics or Orthodox Christians. It is too late to 
terminate those ‘pregnancies.’ The West must be ready to look after the offspring of this 
cohabitation, just as the East must take its share of the responsibility. 
This is a new phenomenon in the history of Eastern and Western societies. During the 
Middle Ages and the Muslim Renaissance Muslims living on non-Muslim territories 
were an exception, whereas non-Muslims living on Muslim lands were commonplace. 
That is why there was a law on non-Muslims on Muslim territory – the so-called dhimmi 
– whose basic codes, modified and modernized, are respected to this very day even if 
only as a system of rules, taboos and a definite distance in interaction. 
By contrast, a well defined and comprehensive law on Muslims in the Christian world 
has never been produced in any European country – in the past because of the philosophy 
of imperial, colonial and postcolonial superiority and arrogance, and at present because 
that would conflict with the democratic norms. Thus the West relies, in addition to some 
elements associated with personal practices, mainly on its immigration laws, legal norms 
                                                 
22 Davutoglu, A. The Interreligious and Intercivilizational Interaction in the Global Era: The Case of 
Turkey-EU Relations, unpublished conference paper. 
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on citizenship and naturalization, labour law, and the universally valid principles of 
human rights. Paradoxically, today Europe and the US are riven by the need of 
reformulating the status of their Muslim minorities and their integration into the overall 
hierarchy of social and public relations. Even within the most public-spirited and left-
wing spheres of Western societies, such as the trade unions, there are incurable outbreaks 
of racism against immigrants who are involved in labour market competition. Distracted 
by the need to regulate constantly the chronic outbursts of fear of the ‘shocking’ cultural 
signs of Islam and the waves of Islamophobia, the West is oblivious to the fact that this 
problem has affected the Muslim world just as, or even more, deeply and dramatically. 
The fact that the Muslims are attracted by and find an alternative in the Christian lands, 
abandoning or suppressing their Muslim traditions and rules, is a new and big challenge 
to the Islamic world in terms of both theory and practice. 
Our Turkish colleague Prof. Davutoglu has made a comparative analysis of the change in 
Muslim ‘residence’ in the West in the 20th century, identifying four phases in the status of 
Muslims resident in Europe: Phase 1: students and embassy staff; Phase 2: students and 
embassy staff; Phase 3: students, embassy staff, workers and immigrants; Phase 4: 
students, embassy staff, workers, second-generation immigrants, citizens and institutional 
development.23 We must invariably bear in mind that these phases are yet to be 
continued… 
It is entirely obvious that Prof. Davutoglu’s simple scheme applies to Bulgaria too, where 
the phases in immigration from the Near and Middle East are identical. In Bulgaria, 
however, the phase of institutional development has not occurred yet owing to the fact 
that the number of immigrants at present is arguably insignificant. 
The number of Muslim citizens in the West is growing fast, and this poses many national 
and international challenges such as political participation, social integration, cultural 
cohabitation, inclusion or exclusion, and ethnocentric reactions. Irrespective of the 
problems and challenges, the demographic and institutional presence of Muslims in 
Europe in particular and in non-Muslim countries in general is growing parallel with 
globalization. 
On the other hand, a new geopolitical culture is emerging in the Muslim world. The 
fundamental characteristic of this new geopolitical culture may be summed up as 
‘pluralism versus ethnic or religious centrism.’ The process is accelerated by the actual 
modernization of the Muslim world, invisible as the former might be for the Europeans 
and the US. The Western world seems to have been deaf and blind to the complex 
philosophical, theological and cultural anthropological debates within the transnational 
Muslim intellectual elite in the last 15 years. The Muslims need peace and quiet to reach 
new levels of modernization by their own ways and means. It was futile and selfish on 
the part of Western politicians to intervene brutally and to disrupt or escalate this debate, 
causing extreme radicalization of the participants in it through their reckless foreign 
policy. Especially considering that this was done at the very time when European and 
North American scholars were engaged in a parallel debate on the subject of the 
dimensions, capacities, philosophy, morals and boundaries of multiculturalism, naturally 
also in the context of the new Muslim minorities. 
Prof. Davutoglu has brought greater clarity to the geography and demography of this 
civilizational diffusion by outlining several geopolitical zones. It is obvious that they are 
                                                 
23 Davutoglu, speech. 
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formed most visibly (but not only) on a linguistic basis. These zones may be classified as 
particular regional categories, each one of which is populated by approximately 200 to 
250 million Muslims: 1. Turkish and Turkic-speaking Eurasian component from the 
Balkans to Central Asia (here I would add the Slavic-speaking Muslims and Muslim 
Roma from the Balkans); 2. Arabic-speaking Central Eastern and North African 
component; 3. Mostly Swahili- and Hausa-speaking sub-Saharan African component; 4. 
Urdu- and Bengali-speaking subcontinental Indian component; and 5. The Malay-
speaking Indo-Malayan archipelago. There are also significant passages of geocultural 
zones such as the Persian-speaking Iranian zone between Eurasia, Central Asia and the 
Subcontinent, and Sudan between the Arabic and sub-Saharan component. 
Almost all these geocultural zones have a geographical extension in the form of Muslim 
minorities in neighbour countries, and in the Western and Northern geopolitical zones. 
The second-generation (and in some places the third-generation) Muslim minorities in 
Europe and North America can create a new cultural axis in the near future in the form of 
Euro-Islam and American Islam. For example, in some parts of the US – in Missouri, 
Pennsylvania or Florida – a second generation of Muslim Bulgarians (Pomaks) from the 
Rhodopi Mountains is being born and growing up. 
Bulgaria has the experience of the emigration of hundreds of thousands of people from 
the Turkish minority in 1989, who several years after settling down and adapting in the 
mother country realized that they are once again a minority, albeit among co-nationals 
and co-religionists, because they had brought a different cultural model. That is why they 
started calling themselves European Muslims, whereas one of the cities in which they 
settled down en masse came to be called by their fellow citizens, the indigenous Turks, 
gâvur Bursa (infidel Bursa) – so distinct were the cultural differences between these 
populations despite their common ethnic and religious origins. 
In this context, it is also worth noting the special place of Turkey in this tangled web of 
newly developing relations between the East and the West. 
Turkey’s special geostrategic and geoeconomic position is strengthened by the fact that it 
has intercivilizational and interreligious influence in the age of globalization. 
Turkey’s geographical location and historical heritage (of the Ottoman Empire) faces it 
with major challenges in the age of global transformation. Those factors are shaping 
Turkey as a country of intercivilizational interaction, synthesis and confrontation between 
the East and the West, Islam and Christianity, Asia and Europe, tradition and modernity, 
the local and the global. Turkish culture is guided by two different and sometimes 
alternative combinations of values, institutions and way of life. 
As the successor to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was the boundary between the Islamic 
and Western Christian civilizations. The Ottoman Empire, which ruled Eastern and 
Central Europe to Vienna, dominated parts of Europe until the 18th century. Turkey has 
remained under the impact of this historical heritage despite the process of radical 
Western orientation. Its population is mostly Muslim, but there is an ambitious project for 
consistent secularization and integration into European structures. It would be wise for 
the whole Western world to encourage this long-term project. 
The reality on the Balkans, however, includes the fact that in the areas of former 
Yugoslavia populated by compact Muslim communities, and especially those that lived 
through wars (for example, Bosnia), the influence of non-traditional for the Balkans 
strands of Islam has grown tangibly. Instead of the moderate Islamic and pan-Turkic 
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propaganda from secular Turkey to the former Ottoman Balkan provinces, in Bosnia, 
Sanjak, Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo there is a visible and invisible reorientation 
from the Hanafite school and mainstream, typical with its soft syncretic forms, Islam 
towards the unquestionable influences from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. 
Although this is not recognized and admitted by local Islamic theologians, the Balkans 
are being invaded by the schools of the Hanbalites and the Shafiites. The profile of 
Balkan Muslims, especially in various parts of former Yugoslavia, is changing towards 
models of isolation and religious capsulation, which is a source of strong concern for the 
local Christian majorities and creates conditions for interreligious suspicions and latent 
Islamophobia that sooner or later might surface. 
In the last five years Bulgaria, according to one of our respondents, has also been targeted 
by different mazhab/mesheb (schools) and there are intense theological debates between 
the traditional for the country Hanifites and the newcomer Shafiites and occasional 
Malikites. Asking what a typical day at the mosque was like and were religious issues 
discussed between prayers, we learned that: ‘The Koranic rules are observed only in the 
mosque in Sofia. Everybody prays and contemplates regardless of which mesheb they 
belong to – this remains an intimate secret of the believer. If you feel the need to ask 
something or to get a particular case explained to you, you ask your question and only the 
imam is authorized to answer according to the Hadith and the Koran. In all other towns 
there have been theological debates in the past few years between the representatives of 
different cemaats and strands, which distracts believers from behaving properly in the 
mosque, i.e. from reflecting on the essence of Islam and on the unique rightness of the 
Hadith. In the mosques in the provincial towns, if you ask a question you are immediately 
surrounded by everybody present and eagerly offered the interpretation of their particular 
shaykh – which is against the rules.’ 
Our Muslim team member qualified this as follows: ‘This is bad, but this is also good 
because the Prophet, may He rest in peace, has said: “The time shall come when my 
community will divide into 73 cemaats [sects and communities], and among them only 
one shall be saved while the others shall die”. This time has now come and the end of the 
division is in sight because the mesheb will soon become 73 and then the deviation from 
the Sunna and the Koran will end.’ 
 
Religiosity of the immigrants. This was undoubtedly one of the most delicate and difficult 
to establish and analyze questions in the present study. The reason is that the respondents 
themselves and, generally, the Muslim immigrants in Bulgaria differ by their attachment 
to Islam and observance of Muslim customs and rituals. They also differ by their 
sympathies and allegiance to the different schools and strands of Islam, as well as by their 
contradictory attitude to and assessment of the system of religious rules under which they 
have been brought up and which they have left as emigrants. Naturally, this whole 
complex of external factors and internal spiritual states that gravitates around faith and 
denomination is very intimate, and it was extremely difficult for the sociologists to 
extract frank answers from the respondents by means of the usual questions. This made it 
necessary for the anthropologists to conduct longer observations and apply a specific 
approach by including a representative of the target group in the team and by participant 
observation. 
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A considerable part of the Arab immigrants have a sense of relief, which they admit 
rarely and reluctantly, that they have left behind the strict religious rules, norms and 
restrictions in their family milieu and generally in their homeland. They enjoy the newly 
acquired freedoms, their own liberation from the dogmatic norms after settling in 
Bulgaria. Of course, all this has not only a moral but perhaps above all a pragmatic effect. 
This liberation from an entire system of complex rules that presuppose restrictions in 
every single aspect of business and private life and, consequently, far fewer personal, 
material and social gains, is unquestionably one of the factors for the choice of the host 
country. 
The primary data on the declared religious affiliation of Arab immigrants in Bulgaria are 
the following: 84.9% are Muslim, 6.4% are Christian, 7.8% of the Arabs in Bulgaria 
identify themselves as atheists, and 0.9% say they belong to other religious 
denominations. The analysis of those figures by period of immigration in Bulgaria 
suggests some interesting conclusions. For example, it becomes obvious that the highest 
percentage of atheists, 10%, are among the earliest immigrants, i.e. those from the first 
group who came before 1990 – the majority of them were students who were admitted to 
Bulgarian universities as part of the policy of ‘socialist solidarity with the fraternal 
peoples.’ In a sense, their atheism may also have another explanation, because the 
percentage of those who lived in the capital of their home country, i.e. the most modern 
and largest population centre, before emigrating is highest precisely among the first wave 
of immigrants from the Near and Middle East – almost 48%. The highest percentage of 
atheists precisely among the first wave of immigrants cannot be explained by the fact that 
they have lived longest in communist atheist Bulgaria, because the second largest 
percentage of immigrants who identify themselves as atheists, 7.1%, are from the third 
wave, which peaked in 2000. Those of the immigrants from the second wave, 1991-1997, 
who say they are atheists are the fewest, at just 4.5%.24 
These findings are supported by the answers to the question, ‘Do your children study 
your religion?’ once again broken down by year of immigration in Bulgaria. An average 
of approximately 40% of the Arab immigrants in Bulgaria answered in the affirmative. 
Of them, the majority – almost 54% – immigrated to Bulgaria between 1991 and 1997, 
followed by immigrants from the first wave (before 1990), 31.1%, and just 12.5% of 
those who came after 1997 (however, the number of those among them who are married 
with children is also the smallest). 
Here is what we were told by a Syrian respondent, a doctor by training who currently 
owns an Arab restaurant in Plovdiv, on the subject of religious adaptation and 
compromises with faith in the new milieu: ‘I came to Bulgaria as a medical student in 
1984. There were 223 of us, 220 boys and three girls. Just 25 of us have remained in 
Bulgaria, and we all have Bulgarian wives. All the others went home. Upon graduating, I 
worked several months as a doctor in Kurdjali for 90 leva a month, and I couldn’t afford 
even my transport fare. My father and my brothers [he has eight brothers and two sisters] 
in Syria are all into the restaurant business. I was the only one to emigrate. I considered 
myself superior to my brothers and wanted to become a doctor. I like Bulgaria because 
there is no discrimination here. I’ve been to Switzerland and Germany, and it’s much 
worse there in this respect. I am a religious Muslim. I don’t go to the mosque because I 
sell alcohol and this is a haram [sin]. I have no right to go to the mosque and to interact 
                                                 
24 These percentages are calculated on the basis of the average percentage share of atheists, 7.8%. 
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with the pious believers.’ The respondent explained that it was a question of ethics on his 
part to excommunicate himself from the community of pure believers after accepting the 
rules in Bulgaria and making a living by selling alcohol. He told us how his mother had 
come to visit him in Plovdiv. She was delighted when he showed her around his 
restaurant, approved her son’s achievements, and then suddenly spotted the bar and the 
bottles of alcohol. She pointed at them and asked, pale with fear: ‘What’s that?’ He was 
forced to lie to her and explained that this was the Bulgarian way, the Bulgarian custom 
and tradition, but he didn’t charge for the alcohol served in his restaurant. This comforted 
the mother to some extent, but our respondent fell in the trap of another grave sin for 
Muslims, lying to your mother. 
This story severely upset and angered the Muslim member of our team, who called our 
respondent a hypocrite: ‘Islam can never be a setback for anybody. No matter which part 
of the world you live in and what the local rules are, if you’re a Muslim you know how to 
behave, how to live and what rules to follow. He’s simply a Muslim by origin but not by 
essence…’ 
A respondent from Morocco said that he had come to Bulgaria a pious Muslim. But he 
could not get used to the cold weather. He turned to other immigrants for advice and was 
told that he should eat meat and, especially in winter, pork. But his religion banned pork, 
didn’t it? He phoned his father because he felt unwell and didn’t know what to do. His 
father thought about it for a while and then advised him: ‘Say bismillyah and eat pork if 
the climate requires it, Allah will forgive you.’ 
Conclusions about the level of religiosity and abidance by the Islamic tradition after 
emigrating to the host country can also be drawn from the discussions about the place of 
the woman in the family. Here the respondents’ answers were almost identical, with a 
difference of 1% to 4% between the three immigration waves. On average, 41.2% of the 
Arabs said that the most important thing for a woman is to bring up the children, 14.7% 
thought this is to look after the house, 27.9% noted that a woman should do what she 
believes is the most important (for the home and the family), and just 16.2% considered 
that she should work equally with the man. 
The children in the families of 54.7% of the Arab immigrants consistently study the 
traditions, rites and history of Islam and of the ethnic group/clan, probably also of the 
native country. At the same time, almost 62% of the immigrants make sure that their 
children learn their native language. For the same reason – a desire to preserve the 
national tradition, language and customs – around 10% of the immigrants try to send their 
children to a school where there are more students of the same nationality (i.e. some 
schools at embassies or the three Sofia schools offering Arabic language courses), 18.2% 
choose private schools, and 1.2% leave their children to study at home. A total of 10.3% 
of the immigrants take the most drastic approach, deciding that their children will not 
study in Bulgaria to prevent their assimilation and loss of Muslim virtues because of the 
country’s secular educational system. These are probably also the immigrants who plan 
to return to their home country eventually. 
The implications of these data are not as dramatic as they might seem at face value, 
because the majority of parents, almost 42%, send their children to the school that is 
closest to their home, while another almost 19% want to send their children to the best 
possible Bulgarian school. Those who turn to private schools do not really have a very 
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big choice and may select one of the standard foreign-language teaching private schools, 
which conform to the requirements of Bulgaria’s general educational system. 
Our final hypothesis based on our empirical findings is that the share of Arab immigrants 
who abide strictly by Islamic religion and traditional rites and customs, as well as of the 
adherents to some more radical strands and schools of Islam, is between 2% and 8% of 
the entire Muslim immigrant community. Those are the 8% of immigrants whose wives 
do not have a single female Bulgarian friend, 4.3% whose children do not have a single 
Bulgarian friend, 1.2% who teach their children at home, and 10.3% who might have 
chosen Bulgaria as their second country but nevertheless refuse to send their children to 
Bulgarian schools because they are afraid they will be exposed to influences that are 
unacceptable to Muslims 
Last but not least, and with significant reservations, we will note that from the 223 
respondents selected by random sampling and interviewed in April 2004, six were 
adherents to non-traditional for Bulgaria schools and strands of Islam (mainly Wahhabis, 
Nursis and Habashis), who were practicing as Islamic missionaries among the local 
Muslims – which is 2.7% of our empirical sample. It is quite likely that this might be 
the real percentage of Arabs who propagate more radical strands of Islam in 
Bulgaria. 
 
Reasons for migration from the Near and Middle East. The reasons for migration may be 
classified in two main groups: political and economic. In the course of the study we also 
identified a third factor for emigration, namely the demographic one – huge families that 
are incapable of securing decent standards of living or sufficient livelihood, which forces 
some of the sons to leave home in search of a livelihood abroad. 
Some countries have high emigration rates in principle and they are due, among other 
things, to a long tradition of hereditary merchants. In them emigration is not limited to a 
particular period of, for example, political destabilization or economic stagnation. For 
instance, there has always been steady emigration from Lebanon and the Lebanese 
diaspora is recognizable anywhere in the world. After 20 or 30 years abroad, some 
wealthy Lebanese emigrants decide against returning home for good, but they build large 
houses in Lebanon and spend a couple of months there every year. 
Still, the majority of Lebanese immigrants said they had moved to Bulgaria to escape the 
insecurity in their home country. Those are people who have traumatic memories of the 
civil war in Lebanon and openly admit that they are afraid of the tense situation in Iraq as 
well as of possible Islamic terrorist attacks on Lebanese territory. 
Political reasons are the main factor for emigration for some of the immigrants from Iraq 
and Afghanistan. They are related to the totalitarian or fundamentalist regimes in their 
countries in the past, and the unclear political future and local resistance against the 
international military presence today. Political instability and civil wars have also had a 
significant impact on emigration flows from Lebanon and Palestine. For some of the 
respondents Bulgaria is a suitable place for acquiring a political status that would secure 
them greater freedom of movement. This group, which identifies itself as political 
emigrants, views Bulgaria as a possible stepping-stone to emigration to Western Europe 
and the US. 
Despite the declared political reasons for emigration, there are almost always private, 
economic and social factors too. For the majority of political emigrants the lack of 
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economic prospects for development in their home countries is obviously the main and 
not infrequently the only reason for emigration. Others are clearly driven by a desire to 
build a safer and securer life for their families. In this sense, the definition of part of the 
immigrants as ‘political emigrants’ is somewhat arbitrary. 
The major factor influencing migration trends is the economic one. It may be examined 
in two directions: the socioeconomic situation and demographic processes in the 
countries from the Near and Middle East, and the socioeconomic processes in Bulgaria in 
the 1990s. 
According to some experts, economic growth in the developing countries from the Near 
and Middle East is rather slow and cannot catch up with the fast population growth.25 
These trends are not expected to change significantly in the medium term. The level of 
modernization and production in most countries from the region is also insufficient and 
unlikely to speed up economic growth. The pessimistic economic forecasts are also based 
on the fact that there are a number of hotbeds of political, religious and ethnic conflicts, 
which increase the overall instability of the region. The Gulf War and the economic 
sanctions against Iraq have shown that the region can easily fall hostage to external 
political pressure with serious economic and social consequences. All this makes this 
group of countries extremely risky for investors and a potential source of emigration 
flows. 
It is noteworthy that the overwhelming majority of the Arab immigrants in Bulgaria come 
from big cities or the capital of their respective country. Just 3.6% of the immigrants 
from the Near and Middle East are of rural origins. This naturally determines also their 
occupational profile prior to emigration – the majority of them were craftsmen and 
merchants, which are typical urban occupations. 
It is expected that the tendency towards growing migration from the conflict-torn and 
developing countries in the Near and Middle East will remain in place in the next 
decades. The main direction of emigration will be towards countries with high living 
standards – the large oil-producing emirates, the Western European countries and the US. 
The difficult access to this group of wealthy countries will redirect part of the emigration 
flows towards comparatively poor countries which, however, have promising economic 
development prospects. This group consists mainly of the countries in Eastern and 
Central Europe. Bulgaria is attractive for emigrants from the Near and Middle East 
because of some market advantages related to its geographical location and positive 
economic development prospects. Bulgaria also largely has the same comparatively 
low technological level and the same market tastes, and this is an important factor 
for the rapid adaptation of Arab merchants and entrepreneurs to the Bulgarian 
market. 
 
Employment/occupation of immigrants. Most of the immigrants from the Near and 
Middle East are employed in trade in foodstuffs (meat, confectionery) and clothes, the 
restaurant business, the car repair industry, and sale of car parts. The majority of 
respondents said that they are small merchants with little capital and limited 
opportunities. Back home they felt cornered by the big economic factors that have 
                                                 
25 The majority of respondents come from families with eight, ten or twelve children. For the majority of 
Syrian immigrants precisely this is the main reason for emigration. 
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monopolized the national markets, therefore their only way out was to look for foreign 
markets. 
To achieve their economic objectives, the immigrants arrived in the country with their 
own capital. It is usually between US$ 10,000 and 40,000, rarely more. By rule, a retail 
outlet is rented by several partners who pool their available capital. 
As regards employment by sector, the situation is the following: 20.1% of the immigrants 
are employed in wholesaling, 46.9% in retailing, approximately 27.8% in services, and 
just 4.3% in manufacturing. 
A more detailed analysis shows that the employment/occupation profile of immigrants 
from the Near and Middle East and the Maghreb corresponds to the visible picture in 
Sofia and the other bigger cities. High-skilled labour/services are performed by 9.7% of 
the Arabs; 7.2% have private businesses in trade in foodstuffs and coffee and the 
restaurant industry; 14.5% have private businesses in trade in clothes, footwear, bags, 
textiles etc.; approximately 14% have private businesses in trade in household appliances, 
white goods and electronic equipment; and around 10% carry on unclear business 
activities. A total 12.1% trade in car parts, 14.5% are employed in trade, 9.2% are chefs, 
7.2% are employed in crafts and manufacturing, and just 1% are low-skilled labourers. 
It is obvious that among the Arab immigrants there are no destitute or low-income groups 
– the majority belong to the middle or slightly higher income groups in Bulgaria. 
We also asked the respondents if they were satisfied or disappointed with their present 
employment or occupation. Actually, a large part of the people with higher education, 
especially from the first wave of immigration, are now earning their livelihood in the 
sectors mentioned above and regret the fact that they have not found appropriate 
conditions in Bulgaria for professional realization as well-paid specialists. In this sense, 
the number of people who wish to perform high-skilled labour is three times higher than 
the actual figures noted above: approximately 27.4% wish to apply their training and 
perform high-skilled labour, and of them almost 51% are immigrants from the first wave. 
If those unfulfilled wishes (which are backed by diplomas obtained, in the majority of 
cases, in Bulgaria) are listed as actual occupations, the respondents feel they have not 
found professional realization as: agronomists, engineers, lawyers, doctors, dental 
mechanics, architects, archaeologists, military officers, foreign traders, journalists, 
economists, computer specialists, kinesitherapists, university lecturers, translators, etc. 
Those unfulfilled wishes are an appropriate subject of reflection on the host society and 
its capacity and readiness to facilitate the integration of highly qualified immigrants. 
This, of course, is also a question of worldview as well as of real policies. In the eyes of 
the Arabs who have graduated in the above-mentioned subjects, and in the eyes of their 
families and societies, they have qualified in prestigious professions that are paid 
adequately in their home countries. That is why the highly qualified immigrants cannot 
resign themselves to the humiliating pay of specialists in Bulgaria and prefer to start their 
own small business because it allows them to secure better living standards for their 
families. That is also why Bulgarian specialists are leaving Bulgaria in search of more 
adequate pay for their prestigious professions, including in the home countries of the 
immigrants in Bulgaria. These are paradoxes of the short-sighted employment policy in 
Bulgaria: there is something wrong (and it becomes very obvious in the present study) if 
you have Arab doctors and architects working as dealers in car parts in Bulgaria and 
 34
Bulgarian doctors and architects working as specialists in Arab countries far from their 
families, relatives and their traditional culture. 
The assessment of the economic climate in Bulgaria in the last 14 years is based on the 
opinions of the immigrants from the Near and Middle East themselves. They said that 
they started their retail business in Bulgaria in 1990-1991. These years saw the beginning 
of privatization of state and municipal retail outlets, which cleared the way for the market 
entry of new private businesses. 
Three periods may be identified in the process of the restructuring of the Bulgarian 
market: 1990-1995, 1996-1997, and after 1998. 
According to the respondents, the first period was extremely favourable for trade. It was 
characterized by high turnover and profit rates, low tax expenditures, a relatively stable 
albeit declining purchasing power of the population, and weak competition. It was in this 
first period that the majority of foreigners employed in trade and services came to 
Bulgaria. Most respondents said they were particularly impressed with the low rent 
charged for retail areas and shops. At that time rents in Damascus were ten times higher. 
The second period (1996-1997) is defined as a period of stagnation with a tendency 
towards declining turnover and profit rates. Two main factors for the deteriorating 
business climate are identified. The first is associated with the glutted market and general 
decline of the turnover rates of the individual merchants. The second is associated with 
the financial destabilization, shock of hyperinflation and subsequent slump in the overall 
purchasing power of the population, which was forced to drastically cut back on 
consumption. 
The third period (after 1998) is defined by the respondents as a period of stagnation and 
decline of profits. Among the negative factors they noted the sharp increase in tax 
expenditures and government controls. The possibilities for double accounting and hiding 
real turnover and profits have been restricted significantly. According to the respondents, 
‘in the last three or four years trade in Bulgaria has slowed to a trickle.’ Some are already 
contemplating looking for new opportunities in third countries, while others intend to 
wait until the business climate improves. 
The expectations of the future are unclear: ‘We’re expecting the king [Prime Minister 
Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha] to do something so that the business climate will improve.’ 
The majority of respondents declared that they could not make plans for the next one or 
two years because the laws are changing every month and taxes are rising: ‘We are now 
working in the red and the way things are going we might well close down our business.’ 
All this is among the reasons why the flow of immigrants from the Near and Middle East 
has been declining in recent years – which, however, is not a long-term tendency. 
 
Cultural forms of adaptation. The male immigrants from the Near and Middle East in 
Bulgaria rarely demonstrate the cultural and religious traits typical of the Arab Muslim 
world. They dress in secular style, the same way as the Bulgarians, do not grow beards 
(some have moustaches only) or wear caps, and rarely hold rosaries. 
Muslim customs are more strictly observed by the female immigrants. By rule, they wear 
a yashmak or its modern variant and a white headscarf, and henna the tips of their fingers 
for religious festivals. Among immigrant children, the traditional cultural and religious 
traits are barely or not visible at all. 
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The large-scale conversion to a secular dress style among the men is explained by the 
respondents themselves with their wish not to be different from the Bulgarians: ‘If I live 
here I must dress like the Bulgarians, behave like them.’ Unlike the women, which by 
rule stay at home and look after the children, the men work in the shops, market stalls or 
restaurants and interact mainly with Bulgarians. Another factor for the adoption of 
secular elements is the high percentage of mixed marriages. We should also note the 
comparatively weak religiosity of the respondents. Few of them observe the religious 
taboos on specific foods and alcohol, and fasting during Ramadan. Going to the mosque 
is not a key priority either. The self-identification as Muslim is above all an expression of 
cultural identity and origins, and it is not so closely connected with Islamic religious 
rules. 
The growing flow of immigrants faces Bulgarian society with new challenges. A study of 
the processes of adaptation of immigrants and their acceptance by the host society, as 
well as a detailed study of their specific religious and national features with which they 
arrive in Bulgaria, are urgently required for developing responsible institutional policies 
related to their status and integration into the new environment. Such processes have been 
taking place with great intensity in the countries in Western and Northern Europe for 
more than half a century now, and these countries have gained rich experience in this 
respect. Bulgaria can use this experience to avoid many of their mistakes, and it can also 
draw on its own centuries-long tradition of multicultural and multiethnic cohabitation. 
Above all the country must not sit back and wait until the objective processes of 
migration lead to the creation of problem situations. Preventive action might prove to be 
not only more effective but also cheaper and, most importantly, could protect society 
against extreme forms of xenophobia and Islamophobia. 
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